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In this article, I explore Jacques Derrida’s programm e of deconstruction, in an attempt to indicate, and argue for, the possibilities that it might
hold as a p hilosophical fram ework for edu cational discourse. Such  poss ibilities a re se t out, n ot dire ctly by way of a set of applications or
methodologies to be followed, but rather by an exposition and interpretation of the Derridian text w ith the intention of relating deconstruction
to educational discou rse. I set about this, by examining Derrida’s comm entary on the nature of deconstruction in relation to some of the
central concepts in  Derrida’s w ritings, such as, d ifférance , justice, the  other, and resp onsibility. 
Introduction
In the recent past there has been an increasing interest by those in-
volved in education, with the work of Jacques Derrida (b1930), the
French philosopher, author of deconstructionism, and one of the lea-
ding figures in the postmodern movement. This interest has primarily
had to do with the search for new ways of thinking about education
and the challenges it confronts in today’s societies. In what follows,
I explore Derrida’s programme of deconstruction, in an attempt to
reveal the possibilities that it might hold as a philosophical framework
for educational discourse. Such possibilities are set out, not directly by
way of a set of applications or methodologies to be followed, but
rather by an exposition and interpretation of the Derridian text with the
intention of relating deconstruction to educational discourse. I set
about this, by examining Derrida’s commentary on the nature of de-
construction in relation to some of the central concepts in Derrida’s
writings, such as, différance, justice, the other, and responsibility. 
Derrida and deconstruction
The concept of ‘deconstruction’ was formulated by Jacques Derrida
in the 1960s out of the philosophical writings of Heidegger, and re-
veals a way of knowing which typifies French poststructural and
postmodern thinking. Literary theorists of the 1960s welcomed struc-
turalism with a John Hopkins University conference on the importance
of the structural enterprise. At this conference Derrida gave his paper
on Structure, sign, and play in the discourse of the human sciences,
that identified paradoxes in structuralist reading. His paper is collected
into Writing and difference, published in translation in 1978. This
provocative commentary revealed the pretense of contextual stability
and introduced a new term: deconstruction. In Speech and phenomena,
originally published in 1967, Derrida addressed the reality of com-
munication and thought modelled on the immediacy of speaking. In Of
grammatology also published in 1976, Derrida took this further by ar-
guing that  signs themselves are unstable and changed as soon as they
are understood. Derrida’s ideas rapidly spread via the Yale School so
that by the 1980s, English Departments in US higher education in-
cluded deconstruction as a major literary theory. Deconstruction sub-
sequently affected literary interpretation and analytical philosophy.
The result was a profound change in understanding; that what is
signified by a Saussurian signifier is not always constant. While
language itself may be endlessly self-referential, it is still possible to
continue thinking linguistically, grammatalogically but only with
uncertainty. Thereby, all meanings are destabilised and better under-
standings are those which acknowledge this instability in meaning.
Derrida used deconstruction in 1966 at the Johns Hopkins
conference to signal going beyond structuralism:
“It is a question of explicitly and systematically posing the pro-
blem of the status of a discourse which borrows from a heritage
the resources necessary for the deconstruction of the heritage
itself.”  (Derrida, 1978:282)
These poststructural ideas were first printed in Derrida’s (1989a)
introduction to Edmund Husserl’s Origin of geometry: an intro-
duction, where he addresses the phenomenological authority for ob-
taining meaning that rests with readers and, as a radical critique of
Western metaphysics, suggests the impossibility of determining ab-
solute, historical truth. Derrida’s critique of Western metaphysics is
important in leading people away from the structuralist belief that the
meaning of language at any one time is both frozen and socially con-
structed. Such a notion of language, Derrida (1973:53; 1978:279)
believes, is championed by what he refers to as the “metaphysics of
presence”. This is the notion that meaning can be grasped in its en-
tirety by language users, that the meanings of words are “present” to
us in our mind when we speak or write them, such that they can be
passed on to others in a fairly pure form. For Derrida (1978:281) this
is a mere illusion, and he contends that discourse in the West is, in
fact, founded on this illusion. We believe that the meanings of words
can be pinned down, and that as long as we strive for precision in our
language use, we can communicate those meanings to others in a
relatively unproblematic fashion. To believe in the “metaphysics of
presence” in this way, is to be committed to what Derrida (1976:3;
1983:40) refers to as, “logocentricity”.
The deconstruction of logocentrism occupies a central place in
Derrida’s writings. In a Roundtable discussion at Villanova University
on October 2, 1994, which was published in a volume by Caputo
(1997), Derrida (in Caputo, 1997:30) stated that a deconstructive rea-
ding of Plato and Aristotle, for example, would entail not repeating
and conserving meaning —  but would entail exposing the tensions
and contradictions in their texts. In other words, deconstruction aims
at revealing the differences in concepts. Derrida would say that, if you
think that our ideas are identities, then deconstruction would reveal a
difference within identity. Caputo (1997:31) who was a participant at
the Villanova Roundtable, claims that “ ... the very meaning of, and
mission of deconstruction, is to show that things —  texts, institutions,
traditions, societies, beliefs and practices of whatever size and sort you
need — do not have definable meanings ... that they exceed the
boundaries they currently occupy.” Caputo (1997:31-31) goes on to
give us a metaphor for what deconstruction is all about. A concept or
an idea or a meaning is like a nutshell. It has a hard boundary. It is a
gathering into a unity, a presence, a logo-centrism. Deconstruction is
an effort to crack open the nut, to go beyond the boundary, to disrupt
the presence and allow the other as difference to come about.” For
Caputo (1997:32), “... cracking nutshells is what deconstruction is. In
a nutshell.” Deconstruction then aims at exposing the fallacy of any
metaphysics of presence and identity. For Derrida (in Caputo, 1997:
42) this means that it “ ... deprives the present of its prestige and ex-
poses it to something toute autre, ‘wholly other’ beyond what is
foreseeable from the present, beyond the horizon of the ‘same’.
Deconstruction, therefore, according to Derrida (in Caputo,
1997:43), is to put a concept “ ... under erasure” (sous rature). It is to
write a word, cross it out, and then print both the word and the de-
letion. Why? Because the word or signifier does not contain the full
meaning. The full meaning is not present. Hence, the word is ina-
dequate.  Yet necessary. To place a word under erasure, therefore, is
to say that the meaning signified by the words which we use cannot
easily  be  pinned  down.   Meaning and  essence can never be fully 
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present in any one sign. This implies that meanings have histories of
textual relations. All meanings are necessarily occupied by residual
traces of other meanings. No meaning is ever simply present or pre-
sent; every meaning is derived from and owes its significance to
meanings that exceed the immediacy of any setting. With the question
of meaning there is, therefore, always a difference, an occurrence of
différance.
Deconstruction and différance
The basic assumptions of deconstruction can, therefore, be said to be
the following:
• that language is ineradicably marked by instability and indeter-
minacy of meaning;
• that given such instability and indeterminacy, no method of
analysis can have any special claim to authority as regards textual
interpretation;
• that interpretation is, therefore, a free-ranging activity more akin
to game-playing than to analysis.
These assumptions arise from Derrida’s (1978:279) reaction to what
he sees as the primary goal of Western metaphysics, namely, the
naming of “truth”, which depends on the assumption that words are
capable of referring accurately to a transcendent reality existing out-
side of language. In response to this claim, Derrida (1982:26) argues
that there is no “transcendental signified”, no reality external to
language. Instead words have meaning only in their relation to other
words. As a result, meaning and reality itself are inseparably inte-
grated with the “play” of language; are intersections of meaning rather
than sites of meaning, and the project of writing “the truth” is always
a programme in accord with a particular value or belief system. For
Derrida (1981:43), there are always gaps in communication, and no
way that meaning can be present in its totality at any one point.
Meaning is to be considered, instead, as a process in a constant state
of change, never quite all there when a word is used, but always dif-
fered from itself, as well as deferred from reaching any sense of
completeness.
Our use of language is, therefore, according to Derrida (1982:7;
13) marked by what he calls “différance” (a neologism coined by him
from the French word “différence”, the latter carrying the meaning of
both “difference” and “deferral”). The fact that the latter meanings
cannot be distinguished in speech, but only in writing, demonstrates
for Derrida the inherent instability of meaning, which, as he puts it, is
always both “differed” and “deferred” (and the words “différance” and
“différence” are indistinguishable in speech too). Deconstruction as
movement of thought, is primarily concerned to draw our attention to
the fact of linguistic instability. Différance, the manifestation of that
instability, is to be found, Derrida (1982:21) argues, everywhere in our
discourse, serving to disrupt our conventional conception of language
as a stable medium for the communication of meaning between indi-
viduals. 
Sim (1999:36) notes that one of the consequences of Derrida’s
views on language is that all discourses are seen to depend heavily on
rhetoric and the play of language. Philosophy, therefore, has no greater
claim to truthfulness than say, literature, since it is no less subject to
the slippage of meaning. Philosophers may well strive for precision of
meaning in their arguments, both written and spoken, but they are no
more able to achieve this ideal than is any other language user, and the
widely held idea that  philosophy can stand as a final court of appeal
on questions of meaning and truth value is, from a deconstructionist
perspective, merely another illusion that we allow ourselves to be
taken in by western culture. All writing is to be considered as marked
by the operation of différance (differed from/deferred from), and none
can claim to have any greater authority than the rest.
Following on from this, Derrida (1976:3; 1983:40) goes on to
challenge the assumption that spoken language, the most immediate
of communication media, can be accepted as the closest representation
of thought. It is a non neutral medium shaped by ideology and bias.
No way of communication, whether in speech or writing, for example,
is more or less direct or unequivocally better. Language has become
endlessly self-referential, and this belief is unlikely to be reversed,
even if the authority of the text is restored. The tradition of searching
for an author’s intended meaning in a text has been reduced to a mere
preconception.
This position does not however invoke irrationality, because as
Derrida (1988:136) states:
“What is called ‘objectivity’, scientific for instance, (in which I
believe firmly, in a given situation), imposes itself only within a
context which is extremely vast, old, powerful, established,
stabilised or rooted in a network of conventions (for instance,
those of language) and yet which still remains a context .... One
of the definitions of what I called deconstruction would be the
effort to take this limitless context into account, to pay the shar-
pest and broadest attention possible to context, and thus to an in-
cessant movement of recontextualisation.”
Also, this does not mean the end of communication for Derrida (1998:
146) also states:
“Within interpretative texts (that is, within relations of force that
are always differential — for example, socio-political — insti-
tutional — but even beyond these determinations) that are rela-
tively stable, sometimes apparently almost unshakeable, it should
be possible to invoke rules of competence, criteria of discussion
and of consensus, good faith, lucidity, rigour, criticism, and peda-
gogy.”
The description of deconstruction thus far would seem to indicate that
deconstruction cannot be presented as a position, and that in that sense
it is not a philosophy.  Deconstruction has to be understood as an oc-
currence or even more precisely: it has to be understood in its oc-
currence. As Derrida (1999:280) explains,
 “ ... it (deconstruction) is not simply a doctrine, not a system, not
even a method, but something which is tied to an event. When I
have to summarise very briefly what deconstruction is, and
should not be, I often say: deconstruction is quite simply what
happens. It is not simply the theoretical analyses of concepts, the
speculative desedimentation of a conceptual tradition, of se-
mantics. It is something which does something, which tries to do
something, to intervene and to welcome what happens, to be
attentive to the event, the singularity of the event. That is why
deconstruction happens as soon as something happens. It did not
appear in the twentieth century, nor as a modern movement in the
academy in the West. No, I think in every event, not only philo-
sophical, in every cultural event there is some deconstruction at
work, something which displaces and opens a structure, a set of
actions, to singularity, to something other, to some alterity, to
some unpredictable future.”
In this sense, Biesta (2001:46) notes that deconstruction can be re-
garded as an activity which attempts to bring into view the im-
possibility to totalize, the impossibility to articulate a self-sufficient,
self-present centre from which everything can be mastered and con-
trolled. In fact, deconstruction reveals that every inside has a con-
stitutive outside which is not merely external but always in a sense
already inhabits the inside, so that the self-sufficiency or self-presence
can only be brought about by an act of exclusion.  What gives decon-
struction its motive and drive is precisely its concern for or, to be more
precise, its wish to do justice to what is excluded, to something other,
to some alterity, to what is unpredictable.
Deconstruction, justice and the other
Derrida (1992a:6) confesses that ethical and political issues have not
occupied a prominent place in most of his writings. He (1992a:7) ac-
knowledges that "there are no doubt many reasons why the majority
of texts hastily identified as 'deconstructionist' ... seem, I do say seem,
not to foreground the theme of justice (as theme, precisely), or the
theme of ethics and politics". Yet, Derrida (1992a:10) admits that, it
was normal, foreseeable, and desirable that studies of a deconstructive
style should culminate in this problematic, and even that deconstruc-
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tion has done nothing but address this problematic, if only "obliquely,"
since "one cannot speak directly about justice, thematize or objectivise
justice, say 'this is just' and even less 'I am just'." That is to say, one
cannot do all this "without immediately betraying justice".  Why is this
so?
The clue to Derrida's answer lies in the contention that justice is
always directed towards the other. Justice, Derrida (1992a:11) argues,
is the relation to the other. Saying, therefore, that something is just, or
that one is just, is a betrayal of the very idea of justice to the extent to
which it forecloses the possibility for the other to decide whether
justice has indeed been rendered. If justice is a concern for the other
as other, for the otherness of the other, for an otherness that, by defini-
tion, we can neither foresee nor totalize, if justice, in short, always
addresses itself to the singularity of the other (Derrida 1992a:20), we
are obliged — in the very name of justice — to keep the unforeseen
possibility of the in-coming of the other, the surprise of the “inven-
tion" of the other, open (Derrida 1989).  This means, however, that the
very possibility of justice is sustained by its impossibility. Justice,
Derrida (1992a:16) summarizes, is therefore "an experience of the
impossible, " where — and this is crucial — the impossible is not that
which is not possible, but that which cannot be foreseen as a possi-
bility.
The implications of this insight are not restricted to the deter-
mination of whether a situation or a person is just, but extend to the
very definition of justice itself.  Here again we can say that it is for the
very sake of justice as a concern for the otherness of the other, that we
can never decide once and (literally) for all what justice is. Justice is,
therefore, not a principle or a criterion (as this would mean that we
would know right now what justice is), nor an ideal (as this would
mean that we would now be able to describe the future situation of
justice), nor even a regulative ideal (which would still imply a de-
scription of what justice is, although with the implication that the ideal
is not expected to be ever present in some future).  It belongs to the
very structure of justice itself that it never can be present (and, there-
fore, never will be present). It is by necessity, according to Derrida
(1992a:27), a "justice to come," which means that it is always to come
in the anticipation of the in-coming of the other. For Derrida (1992a:
28) justice is born out of attention to many particular others. It is de-
fined by its very plurality. Derrida (1992a:29), for example, writes
that, “ ... the condition of all possible justice” would be “ ... to address
oneself to the other in the language of the other.” Justice, then, is an
openness to the other before reflection or reason. It is an engrossment
with the other. But this openness to every other at the same time is
impossible, Derrida (1992:34) tells us, in that it is excluded by law —
in that law assumes a universality by which it can be applied to
everyone. We live in a world where there is always more than one an-
other. We are surrounded by different voices, different tongues. When
we do not address ourselves to every singular voice, justice is denied.
Yet, this plurality cannot be collapsed into any unified narrative. It
responds only to the singularity of the other, of each and every other.
Deconstruction, as justice, is, therefore, primarily concerned with
the question of alterity, that is, with the question of the concrete other,
of "the other, which is beyond language" (Derrida 1984: 123).  Far
from being a philosophy which declares that there is nothing beyond
language and that we are imprisoned in language, deconstruction can
be seen as a response, for as Derrida (1984:118) declares:  "Decon-
struction is, in itself, a positive response to an alterity which ne-
cessarily calls, summons or motivates it.  Deconstruction is, therefore,
a vocation — “a response to a call".
This ethical emphasis in deconstruction has been ignored or over-
looked by Derrida’s critics, such as, Ferry and Renaut (1990),  Fle-
ming (1996),  Habermas (1997) and Hoy (1989), who all argue that
deconstruction is a form of critical analysis which aims at tearing apart
everything it finds on its way. They characterise deconstruction as a
form of textualisation with hyper-relativistic and nihilistic implications
and go onto claim that it is ethically void, politically impotent, and
utterly dangerous.
Biesta (2001:33) argues that Derrida’s critics seriously miss the
point of deconstruction when they accuse it of adopting an extremely
relativistic position. Deconstruction is not a sceptical or relativistic
position,  but rather, it has a distinct ethico-political motivation, or as
Bernstein (1993) so aptly puts it, it has a distinct ethico-political
horizon. Over the past few years there has been a growing recognition
of this horizon, which has led some commentators, such as, Baker
(1995), and Critchley (1999a.1999b), to speak about the “ethical turn”
of deconstruction.
In its most general formulation, the ethico-political horizon of
deconstruction can be described as a concern for the other. Rather than
being destructive, negative, or “an enclosure in nothingness”, decon-
struction is, as Derrida (1884:124) states: “... an openness towards the
other”. For that reason deconstruction can best be characterised as af-
firmative. The deconstructive affirmation of the other is straight-
forwardly positive. It is not merely an affirmation of what already
exists and, for that reason, can be known and identified. Decon-
struction is, Derrida (1992a:27) argues, an affirmation of what is whol-
ly other. It is affirmation, according to, Caputo (1997:42) and Gasché
(1994:122) of what is unforeseeable from the present, of what is be-
yond the horizon of the same. It is an affirmation of an other, Derrida
(1992a:27) maintains, that is always to come, as an event that exceeds
calculation, rules, programs, anticipations and so forth”. More,
therefore, than simply being an openness toward the other, decon-
struction is an openness toward the unforeseeable in-coming (in-
vention) of the other. As Caputo (1997:42) has suggested, decon-
struction might therefore best be thought of as an “inventionalism”.
The encounter with the other is, however, according to Derrida
(1992a:15), impossible. But it is the very “experience of the im-
possible “ which makes the invention, the in-coming of the other,
possible. An invention, Derrida (1989: 60) argues, “ ... has to declare
itself to be the invention of that which did not appear to be possible;
otherwise it only makes explicit a program of possibilities within the
economy of the same”. For Derrida (1992c:9-10), this all means,  that
it is only through our encounter with the singularity of the other, with
the  “the otherness of the other”, that we can further our understanding
by “ ... reaching out to the impossible.” In fact, Derrida (1992c:xlvi)
affirms that, “ ... identity is constituted by the other in the experience
of the impossible.” 
The experience of the other is, therefore, always a particular one.
And in this regard, Derrida (1992a:28) goes onto claim  that it cannot
be generalised into the recognizable language of ethics. The parti-
cularity of the other, according to Derrida (1992a:28), will always be
betrayed by any foray into the universal domain of language, namely,
the language of ethics. Rather, he argues that, the particular experience
of the other and the universality of language are complexly inter-
related in a dynamic tension. Edgoose (2001:127) notes in this regard,
that the relation of particular others to universal language, is a central
theme of education — students turn experiences into knowledge;
mentor teachers explain how they handle classroom situations to
student teachers; and teachers struggle to treat students fairly or to be
agents of justice. Throughout his critical analysis of writing and cul-
ture, Derrida constantly engages with questions about what it means
to think, to learn, to teach, to know, and more specifically what it
means to teach the other as other. In so doing, Derrida (1992a:35)
makes it clear how deconstruction counteracts the “irresponsible
drive” to secure a teleological trajectory of the subject for its “just
completion” along the lines of a teaching of a normative ethics. In this
regard, Edgoose (2001:119) raises the question as to what it means to
create a more just classroom and concludes that it is anything but an
attempt to show how a normative ethics can be taught. Using Derrida’s
(1992a) discussion on justice in his essay, “Force of law”, Edgoose
shows that justice cannot be reached through formulas or programs
but, rather, that it involves a loss of fluency and understanding. He
argues that an educator cannot lead a class toward justice, for justice
depends on the loss of linear control. Justice demands that the voice
of every student be heard. But while the educator feels that there is no
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right choice for his/her attention, sh/e understands that a decision must
be made. This aporia of urgency reveals that there is no smooth path
to justice. In education, Edgoose (2001:132) concludes, that there are
only and necessarily frustrating hesitant steps.
Derrida’s deconstruction of logocentrism, and his incisive com-
mentary on the concept of différance, all lead to deconstruction’s
concern for the other — a concern which Derrida (1992: 35) refers to
as “justice” in even claiming that deconstruction is justice. Decon-
struction’s concern with the other and justice are further developed in
Derrida’s commentary on deconstruction and responsibility.
Deconstruction and responsibility
In his ongoing commentary on the nature of deconstruction, Derrida
(1978:10) is careful to point out that deconstruction should not at any
point be mistaken for destruction or demolition. For instance, when
applied to a text, it is not concerned with emphasising flaws or weak-
nesses, or with returning the text to some meaning existing necessarily
outside its apparent boundaries, or even to some ultimate signified. In
fact, Derrida (1978:11) declares that deconstruction, “ ... inaugurates
... not the demolition but the de-sedimentation, the deconstruction of
all the significations that have their source in that of the logos, parti-
cularly the signification of truth.” Deconstruction as “de-sedimen-
tation” suggests the desedimentation of sedimentary dregs and would
seem to be an activity directed at enumerating various layers of
meaning; the focus being on layers, and not on what they together
form.
Deconstruction, then, is a questioning of all assumptions, not as
an act of demolition, but as a striving for an awareness of what is
involved in a text. However, Derrida (1987:20) also goes onto say
that: “ ... the form of the questions, the questioning syntax, is not taken
for granted, not taken for the first and last form of thinking; so we
have to question the form of questioning.” In this regard, Derrida
(1987:20) believes that deconstruction is affirmative rather than
questioning; this affirmation goes through some radical questioning,
but is not questioning in the final analysis. This, in turn, leads  Derrida
(1992a:23) to conclude, that deconstruction is not  “ ...  a parade of
irresponsible or irresponsibilising destruction ...“.
But what then is the ultimate purpose of deconstruction? Where
are we heading with deconstruction? For Derrida (1995:324), the ans-
wer to this question does not rest in the domain of knowledge, but in
the domain of responsibility or rather responsibilities, for as he states:
“Responsibilities are at stake which, in order to elicit decisions
and events, must not follow knowledge, nor proceed from know-
ledge like consequences or effects. Otherwise we would unfold
a program and behave, at best, like intelligent’ missiles. These
responsibilities, which will determine as you say ‘where it is
heading’ are heterogeneous to the order of formalizable know-
ledge, and probably or no doubt to all the concepts upon which
was built, I would even say arrested, the idea of responsibility or
decision [conscious self, will, intentionality, autonomy and so
on.” 
What Derrida is getting at in this instance, is a rejection of a theo-
retical approach to responsibility. The tradition of Western ethical
thought, from the Christian appropriation of the Ten Commandments
through Kant to the present day, offers moral direction. If one is used
to turning to ethical theories in search of such direction, then, these
theories are the definers of responsibility. They clarify when one is
responsible to someone, or they work out which of one’s obligations
is the more important. They try to articulate when we are responsible
for the other and when we are not. Derrida rejects this foundation and
attempts to develop a quite different understanding of responsibility.
The concept of responsibility can be found explicitly or implicitly
in most of Derrida’s texts. Derrida (1992b:23) establishes a close con-
nection between deconstruction and responsibility when he declares
that deconstruction requires, “ ... a new questioning about responsi-
bility, an inquiry that should no longer necessarily rely on codes
inherited from politics or ethics.”   For Derrida (1992b:7-11), such a
new notion of responsibility will no longer make an appeal to a pure
ethico-juridical agency, to pure practical reason, to a pure idea of law.
Rather, he prefers to think of responsibility as a summons, that is, re-
quiring a response, a summons to reconsider the foundations of what,
throughout Western history, has been deemed responsible or ethical,
and how it was determined, attained and imposed. In this instance the
notion of responsibility would have to be re-elaborated within an en-
tirely novel problematic in which to respond, what to respond about,
and to whom, is a question perhaps more lively and legitimate than
ever. However, not only would the what and the who have to be
thought entirely otherwise, it might also be necessary to consider what
once they might have been. In this regard, Derrida (1992b:12) stresses
that responsibility like deconstruction must also go through antinomic
injunctions, aporiatic forms, through a kind of science of the impos-
sible. In this sense, deconstruction and responsibility merge in their
attempt to apply critical rigour. Not with the intention of dismissing,
discarding, or destroying what might appear or be deemed “wrong” or
“untrue”, but with a serious intent to uncover and reveal dilemmas,
and the very impossibility inherent in these dilemmas to be avoided,
reconciled, or ignored. Stated in another way, deconstruction is not an
exposure of error, certainly not other people’s error. The critique of
deconstruction, the most serious critique in deconstruction, is the cri-
tique of something that is extremely useful, something without which
we cannot do anything.
This theme was developed by Derrida (1992c:41-44) when he
suggested that if responsibility does exist, it can start only with the
experience and experiment of the aporia, that is, the possibility of
argument for two inconsistent positions. In this regard, Derrida (ibid.)
discusses the question of European identity, which is caught, he be-
lieves, in an injunction which seems double and contradictory, caught
in the double bind of the necessity to retain past values while respon-
ding to the equally compelling necessity to distance itself from its
past. The choice is impossible, in fact, as Derrida (1992c:41) observes,
“ ... the condition of possibility of this thing called responsibility is a
certain experience and experiment of the possibility of the impossible:
the testing of the aporia from which one may invent the only possible
invention, the impossible invention.”
Derrida (1995:325) gives two examples to illustrate his point and
underscore the fact that any responsibility implies a dual obligation,
whose aspects are both contradictory and conflictual. These two exam-
ples draw on ethnic and political conflicts in the 1990s: one deals with
minority rights and the necessity of communication and understanding
on the one hand, and respect for the majority law on the other; the
second addresses international law and the Office of the United
Nations and its Security Council. In both cases, it is necessary to go
through aporias in order to take into consideration the uniqueness of
each situation and its complexity. Each time, it is necessary to re-
invent what responsibilities are involved in order to respond to the
singularity of the event, not by ignoring previously developed con-
cepts, but by going beyond them. This dual obligation, contradictory
and conflictual, seems inherent to Derrida’s concept of responsibility,
as opposed to a sheer moral or political approach. In facing such re-
sponsibilities, there is no guarantee, no certitude of a unique, pat, suc-
cessful solution.
A striking example of this concept of responsibility is found in
Derrida’s (1986:9-31) reference to the “antinomies of philosophy”.
They are what he calls “‘the seven contradictory commandments’”
written in an attempt to give a shorter and more convenient exposé to
the polemic which he believes possible within a community willing to
assume the responsibility of analysing and questioning such antino-
mies — in this instance, a philosophical community. Derrida (1986:
10) points out that these commandments entail aporias, which, in turn
represent a “double imperative” and, at the same time, cautions that
they are neither final nor comprehensive, that this list could be shor-
tened or lengthened and that the number seven is somewhat arbitrary.
The list reads as follows:
1. • We must object to the submission of philosophy [its ques-
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tions, its programs, its discipline] to any external finality. 
• We should not, at any cost, renounce the critical and, there-
fore, evaluative and hierarchizing mission of philosophy.
How can these two regimes of finality be reconciled?
2. • We must protest against the closure of philosophy.
• We should demand the unity which we deem proper and
specific to philosophy.
How can this localizable identity and overflowing ubiquity be recon-
ciled?
3. • We believe we have the right to demand that philosophical
research and questioning never be dissociated from tea-
ching.
• We also feel entitled to recall that, perhaps for the most part,
something in philosophy is not limited to, has not always
been limited to, teaching acts, school events, its institutional
structures, or even the discipline of philosophy itself.
Within the same moment of this discipline, how can we maintain both
limit and excess? That these very limits and excesses must be taught?
That they cannot be taught.
4. • We deem normal to demand institutions on a par with this
impossible and necessary, indispensable and useless disci-
pline.
• We postulate that the philosophical norm cannot be reduced
to its institutional appearances.
How can the respect of the institutional limit and its transgression be
reconciled?
5. • In the name of philosophy, we require the presence of a
master.
• If the master must be another, formed then appointed by
others, this heteronomous dissymmetry must not encroach
upon the necessary autonomy, or even the essentially demo-
cratic structure of the philosophical community.
How can [the philosophical community] reconcile and harmonise
within itself this heteronomy and this autonomy?
6. • The discipline of philosophy, the transmission of know-
ledge, the extreme richness of its contents, normally re-
quires time, a certain rhythmical duration, even as much
time as possible.
• The unity, even the architecture of the discipline, requires a
certain organised gathering of this duration.
How can this duration and this quasi instantaneous contraction, this
limitlessness and this limitation, be reconciled?
7. • Students as well as teachers must be given the opportunity,
that is the conditions, to access philosophy .... a master must
initiate, introduce, form his discipline.
• The master is nothing but a mediator who must disappear.
How can the necessity and the dismissal of the master be reconciled?
What incredible topology is required to reconcile the heterodidactic
and autodidactic?
Egéa-Kuehne (1995:304-305) points out that when the word
“education” is substituted for “philosophy” these antinomies become:
1. • We must object to the submission of education [its ques-
tions, its programs, its discipline] to any external finality. 
• We should not, at any cost, renounce the critical and there-
fore evaluative and hierarchizing mission of education.
2. • We must protest against the closure of education.
• We should demand the unity which we deem proper and
specific to education.
3. • We believe we have the right to demand that educational
research and questioning never be dissociated from tea-
ching.
• We also feel entitled to recall that, perhaps for the most part,
something in education is not limited to, has not always
been limited to, teaching acts, school events, its institutional
structures, or even the discipline of education itself.
4. • We deem normal to demand institutions on a par with this
impossible and necessary, indispensable and useless disci-
pline.
• We postulate that the educational norm cannot be reduced
to its institutional appearances.
5. • In the name of education, we require the presence of a 
master.
• If the master must be another, formed then appointed by
others, this heteronomous dissymmetry must not encroach
upon the necessary autonomy, or even the essentially demo-
cratic structure of the educational community.
6. • The discipline of education, the transmission of knowledge,
the extreme richness of its contents, normally requires time,
a certain rhythmical duration, even as much time as pos-
sible.
• The unity, even the architecture of the discipline, requires a
certain organised gathering of this duration.
7. • Students as well as teachers must be given the opportunity,
that is the conditions, to access education .... a master must
initiate, introduce, form his discipline.
• The master is nothing but a mediator who must disappear.
Derrida (1992c:44-45) suggests that these antinomies constitute a ma-
trix that provides,  “ ... all the statements which may possibly be
produced today about ‘School and Philosophy’”. Derrida’s “antino-
mies of philosophy” can, therefore, also be seen as an illustration of
the call for responsibility in education. In fact, Egéa-Kuehne (1995:
305) is of the opinion that education and responsibility are tightly
linked in Derrida’s work, which is often concerned with a call to re-
sponsibility, and a continual questioning of what responsibility re-
presents. Her observation is confirmed in Derrida’s (1992c:20)
declaration that a deconstruction of responsibility calls for an increase
in responsibility for education, that is, in responding to the other. The
deconstruction of responsibility, therefore, makes it possible to think
of education as a response, a responsible response to the other. Such
a response involves education in protecting the singularity of the in-
dividual against its social functualisation. This in turn means that only
when the  concept of education itself is deconstructed can the irreduci-
bility of the other evoked in all education become recognisable, and
can justice become a possibility.
Deconstruction and educational discourse
In recent years educators, educational theorists, philosophers of educa-
tion, and curriculum theorists around the world have shown a moun-
ting interest in Derrida’s work and in his concept of deconstruction
[see, for example, Biesta and Egea-Kuehne (2001), Cherryholmes
(1988), Lather (1991), Stronach and MacLure (1997), Usher and
Edwards (1994), Pinar et al. (1995) and Pinar and Reynolds (1992)].
The major influence of Derrida and deconstruction on the practice of
education originally came from the adoption of deconstruction in Eng-
lish departments. As “a theory of reading and writing” deconstruction
had found its way in the teaching of English, both in writing in-
struction and composition, and in the practice of teaching literature
[see, for example, Atkins and Johnson (1985), Crowley (1989), Gilbert
(1989), Henricksen and Morgan (1990), Miller (1983), Neel (1988)
and Ulmer (1985)].
Although some scholars, such as Biesta and Egea-Kuehne (2001)
and Knoper (1989), have acknowledged the possible political and
ethical implications of deconstructive writing pedagogy, it would seem
that the reception of deconstruction in education, in the first instance,
was primarily  ‘technical’ in its narrow focus on literary analysis [see,
for example, Johnson, 1985)], and has only minimally been concerned
with the political and ethical possibilities of deconstruction in relation
to education. 
Biesta and Egea-Kuehne (2001:4) in attempting to bring to the
fore the ethico-political potential of deconstruction for educational dis-
course, note, that what Derrida’s texts have to offer is not a set of
guidelines, rules, or prescriptions which can be applied to education
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to remedy whatever ails it. The point is not to reduce the profound
arguments which form Derrida’s work to trivial statements used to talk
about implications for schooling. Any attempt to summarise complex
concepts, to recall them more or less exactly, more or less precisely in
order to try and draw some specific implications to be applied to edu-
cation would not carry much meaning, and would amount to a mis-
reading of Derrida. Nor is it a matter of relating Derrida’s thought to
issues in education.  Reading Derrida in the context of education calls
for an engagement with his forms of reasoning in analysing educa-
tional issues. Such an engagement needs an attentive and respectful
reading “ ... through work which actually requires time, discipline, and
patience, work that requires several readings, new types of reading,
too, in a variety of different fields” (Derrida 1995:401). All in all,
Biesta and Egea-Kuhne (2001:5) conclude that deconstruction can
engage a thoughtful reader in some powerful rethinking of education,
analysing all the hidden assumptions which are implied in the phi-
losophical, or the ethical, or the juridical, or the political issues related
to education. In short, a consideration of Derrida’s  seminal works,
reveals the necessity and the possibility of thinking again, through
deconstruction, about education in terms of language, justice, the other
and responsibility.
Cahen (2001:12)  is of the opinion that, not only is the question
of education at the core of Derrida’s writings, but that this is also not
a coincidence. It is not a case of deconstruction and education having
accidentally come together in Derrida’s writings. Cahen (2001:25-26)
argues that, if we acknowledge the radically affirmative nature of de-
construction, then, the question of deconstruction is the question of
education. Cahen makes it clear that deconstruction is not just about
profoundly educational questions such as, ‘who is coming when I
speak to the other?’, and, ‘where am I going when the other speaks to
me?’ Cahen emphasises that in raising the question of how we can
educate ‘the other as other’, how we can let the other be, deconstruc-
tion moves the whole cluster of questions about education, about tea-
ching, from the plane of techniques and methods to a level which is
deeply concerned with the ethical, the political, and ultimately, with
the destination of life, history and humanity.
Much of present day educational discourse is vulnerable to an
ideologically driven educational practice which emphasises that per-
sons be educated for the maintenance and development of environ-
mentally and sociologically determined functions, as well as for the
promotion of the economy (Higgs:1998). In such a context, education
becomes the handmaiden of the state, and, at the same time, serves the
state’s programmes of political intent. Educational discourse which
poses fundamental questions, has, as Aronowitz (2001:ii) notes, vir-
tually disappeared from the mainstream literature. Present day educa-
tional discourse, no longer sees the need to interrogate the givens of
education, or the social and political contexts in which education
functions. As a result, nearly all educational discourse is reduced to
what Aronowitz (2001:xvi-xvii) describes as the application of “ ...
technologies of managing consent, where teaching is increasingly a
function of training for test taking.” All this can be regarded as an
aberration of education, as the mystification of education in the service
of dominant ideologies that see education as a process of information
transfer (mainly of a scientific, technical and legislative kind), and
which, in turn, aim to ensure conformity to political and economically
acceptable norms.
In the light of this, it can be concluded that, what is needed today,
is an awakening of the educational or a return to education. In short,
present day educational discourse must re-think itself. The philoso-
phical challenge of re-thinking education, of deconstructing education,
does not consist in changing, replacing, or abandoning education. On
the contrary, to deconstruct is first and foremost  to undo a construc-
tion with infinite patience, to take apart a system in order to under-
stand all its mechanisms, to exhibit all its foundations, and to recon-
struct on new bases. To be sure, it is a matter of transforming our
relation to education, to reflect on the conditions of such a trans-
formation, and to give ourselves the theoretical and practical means to
do so. In this regard, Derrida’s reflections on deconstruction and
related concepts such as différance,  justice,  the other, and responsi-
bility, can provide a powerful paradigm to develop a greater awareness
of the issues at stake in education; for his texts suggest new ways of
thinking about education and of assuming responsibility in education
in relation to the other, and in the name of justice. I would suggest that
in re-thinking education in terms of a Derridian discourse, we should
address such questions as: how can we educate the other as other?; in
which space can education be realised?; how can we let the other be
as other in the educational encounter?; what, and whose knowledge,
should be transmitted in the educational encounter?; how can we know
in the educational encounter?; what form of instruction should mark
the educational encounter? what is the nature of an educational en-
counter? what of the place of language in the educational encounter?
All these questions, I believe, are constitutive of at least two challen-
ges that Derrida’s works hold for educators. On the one hand, educa-
tors should deconstruct the ideological influences that imprison edu-
cational discourse and in so doing allow the nature of education to
unfold and speak for itself; and on the other hand, educators should
affirm education, and attempt to determine what it can and should  do
today in our society, in the face of new forms of knowledge in general
and the advances of  technology. 
Too often trapped within the walls of a dominant ideology, or
social practices and beliefs, education should  be allowed to think for
itself, expose itself, teach itself. This constitutes the Derridian impera-
tive in its programme of deconstruction with its concern for justice, the
other, and responsible action.
Furthermore, as a particular mode of mind for experiencing ideas,
deconstruction can significantly change the nature of educational dis-
course. Regarding instructional messages as language means consi-
dering them in the context of the Western philosophical tradition, from
Plato to Rousseau to Kant, where all communication media are repre-
sentations of how people think. It is a logocentric tradition that valo-
rises speech over writing. Derrida’s programme of deconstruction
refutes the assumption that spoken language, the most abstract of
communication media, can be accepted as the closest representation
of thought. For Derrida it is a non-neutral medium shaped by ideology
and preconceived bias. No way of communicating, whether in speech
or writing  is more or less direct. No way of communicating is une-
quivocally better for obtaining a convergence of minds than any other.
It is a fallacy to think of thought as language because in itself,
language is undecidable. In this mode education deconstructs like
language and also differently from language. For as Standish (2001:
77-97) argues, in education, learners always go beyond fixed mea-
nings, beyond curriculum objectives, beyond aims, in fact beyond the
stable authority of the teacher. This “going beyond” for Standish is far
from being a threat to meaning and a hence a threat to education.
Rather, Standish (2001:95) argues that it is the very condition for
education, because education only exists, only comes into presence,
as a result of the necessary disruption of the learner. The anxious
preoccupation with clarity, control and containment runs the risk of
stifling what is most important in education, namely, the “going
beyond” in the establishment of the singularity of the individual.
Conclusion
I have set out to explore Jacques Derrida’s programme of decon-
struction, in an attempt to indicate the possibilities that it might hold
as a philosophical framework for educational discourse. Such pos-
sibilities were alluded to, not directly by way of a set of applications
or methodologies to be followed, but rather by an exposition and
interpretation of the Derridian text with the intention of relating de-
construction to educational discourse. Such an exposition and inter-
pretation involved an examination  of Derrida’s commentary on the
nature of deconstruction in relation to concepts such as, différance,
justice,  the other, and responsibility. In examining these concepts, I
have tried to show that deconstruction can deepen our understanding
of education as an activity concerned with the singularity of the other
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as other, and also as an occurrence which acknowledges responsibility
for an other who, as other, is always to come.
Biesta (2001:34) argues that deconstruction should not be con-
ceived as a theory or a philosophy that can subsequently be applied to
education. Deconstruction rather,  provides a way to think again and
afresh, more strictly and more radically about the concern that has
been central to the project of education at least since the Enlighten-
ment. The relationship between deconstruction and education, to put
it differently, is not an accidental relationship. In so far as education
exceeds enculturation, socialisation, and domestication, it is precisely
concerned with otherness with justice, with responsibility. If education
is as Arendt (1968: 196) claims  “ ... where we decide whether to love
our children enough not ... to strike from their hands their chance of
undertaking something new, something unforseen by us”, then there
is every need to think again and again about what this might mean for
those who have the courage to educate. Although deconstruction will
not provide a clear-cut answer to this question, it might well help us
better understand what it means to raise this question today.
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